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Abstract  
 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the role of the European Union in transboundary water 
relations between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) since the Oslo II 
Accords, and in particular the extent to which EU policy is reinforcing Israel’s position 
regarding the shared water resources. The research shows that EU policy contributes towards 
the further consolidation of Israeli control over Palestinian resources, an important aspect of 
the occupation which undermines the possibility of the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. 
The research is based on Marxist views of political economy, arguing that power relations play 
a determining role in the way in which transboundary water interaction takes place between 
Israel and the OPT. Using the framework of hydro-hegemony and Steven Lukes three 
dimensions of power, the analysis shows that there is a discrepancy between EU rhetoric and 
practice which results in the EU sustaining Israel’s hydro-hegemony.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   4	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   5	  
Table of Content 
 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7 
1.1 Research question, hypothesis and structure ................................................................... 8 
1.2 Methodology and limitations ........................................................................................... 8 
1.3 Contribution to the field ................................................................................................... 9 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework ....................................................................... 11 
2.1 Hydropolitics .................................................................................................................. 11 
2.2 Hydro-hegemony and three dimensions of power ......................................................... 17 
3. Israel and the European Union – A special relationship ...................................................... 21 
3.1 The EU’s megaphone diplomacy ................................................................................... 21 
3.2 Refraining from sanctions .............................................................................................. 22 
3.3 Strategic ties ................................................................................................................... 23 
3.4 Economic ties ................................................................................................................. 24 
3.5 Scientific ties .................................................................................................................. 26 
4. The issue of water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ........................................................... 28 
4.1 Access to water for the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip ........................................ 30 
4.2 Access to water for the Palestinians living in the West Bank ........................................ 31 
4.3 Historical background .................................................................................................... 34 
4.4 The Oslo process ............................................................................................................ 35 
5. Sharing water resources with the Palestinians – The Israeli discourse ................................ 40 
5.1 The Israel Water Authority ............................................................................................ 40 
5.2 Water as a scarce resource ............................................................................................. 42 
5.3 Future needs of the Palestinians ..................................................................................... 45 
5.4 The Joint Water Committee ........................................................................................... 47 
6. How EU policy is reinforcing Israeli control over transboundary water resources ............. 49 
6.1 The evolvement of the EU’s position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .............. 49 
6.2 The EU-Palestine Action Plan and the Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine .............. 52 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 57 
7.1 Findings ......................................................................................................................... 57 
7.2 Limitations and implications for future research ........................................................... 59 
8. Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   6	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   7	  
1.   Introduction 
 
When Israel started its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli army 
also took control over the transboundary water resources and infrastructure. Transboundary 
water interaction between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (hereafter OPT) has 
been regulated to some extent by the Oslo II Accords which were signed in 1995, but in reality 
the treaty has further consolidated Israeli control over Palestinian access to water ‘to a level 
which neither meets their needs nor constitutes a fair distribution of shared water resources.’1  
The resulting disparity in access to water between Israelis and Palestinians is truly 
staggering. Water consumption by Israelis is at least four times that of Palestinians 
living in the OPT. Palestinians consume on average 73 litres of water a day per person, 
which is well below the World Health Organization’s (WHO) recommended daily 
minimum of 100 litres per capita. In many herding communities in the West Bank, the 
water consumption for thousands of Palestinians is as low as 20 litres per person a day, 
according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). By contrast, an average Israeli consumes approximately 300 litres of water a 
day.2 
Apart from the effects of Israeli water control on the standard of living of the Palestinians, 
Israeli control over shared water resources limits the possibilities for economic development. 
The Palestinian economy is based on agriculture and small-scale industry.3 Without economic 
development, the OPT cannot increase its level of autonomy which ultimately prevents the 
emergence of a viable Palestinian state. Due to the broader consequences of the occupation for 
the Palestinian economy the OPT has been dependent on donors, of which the European Union 
is the largest provider of external assistance. According to the European Commission, ‘in line 
with the goal of a two-state solution, EU efforts aim at promoting greater Palestinian control, 
autonomy and capacity to exercise responsibility to prepare for future statehood.’4  
 
 
                                                
1 ‘’The Occupation of Water,’’ Amnesty International, November 29, 2017, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/11/the-occupation-of-water/ 
2 Amnesty International, ‘’The Occupation of Water.’’ 
3 Simone Klawitter, ‘’Water as a Human Right: The Understanding of Water Rights in Palestine,’’ International 
Journal of Water Resources Development 23, no. 2 (2007): 306.  
4 ‘’Palestine*,’’ European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, 
accessed on May 18, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/palestine_en 
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1.1 Research question, hypothesis and structure 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the role of the European Union in transboundary water 
relations between Israel and the OPT since the Oslo II Accords. More specifically, guided by 
Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner’s theory on hydro-hegemony and Steven Lukes’ three 
dimensions of power, the analysis provides a comprehensive answer to the following research 
question: To what extent has EU policy regarding transboundary water interaction between 
Israel and the OPT reinforced Israel’s hydro-hegemony?  
 
The main hypothesis is that EU policy regarding issues of water in the OPT is not in accordance 
with the EU’s rhetoric of supporting the two-state solution. Rather, EU policy ultimately 
contributes towards the further consolidation of Israeli control over water, which results in a 
deepening of the colonization of Palestinian land. This discrepancy can be explained through 
an analysis of the particular relationship between Israel and the EU.  
 
As for the structure of the thesis, the second chapter consists of a review of the relevant 
academic literature on hydropolitics and describes the theoretical framework on which the 
research is based. The research is predominantly guided by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner’s 
concept of hydro-hegemony and Steven Lukes’ three dimensions of power. The third chapter 
consists of the contextual background of the case study, namely the relationship between Israel 
and the EU. Subsequently, the fourth chapter explains the issue of water between Israel and the 
OPT by paying attention to the historical background of power dissimilarities. The fifth chapter 
is an analysis of Israel’s discourse regarding the issue of shared water resources with the 
Palestinians on the basis of policy documents by the Israel Water Authority. The sixth chapter 
analyses EU policy and explains the discrepancy between EU rhetoric and practice. The seventh 
chapter then provides an answer to the research question.    
 
1.2 Methodology and limitations 
 
The research can be characterized as a case study. The methods chosen to carry out the research 
are a review of the available academic literature and an analysis of primary sources. The 
primary sources used for this research include the Oslo II Accords, ‘The Parliamentary 
Committee of Inquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, Report’ (State of Israel, 2002), ‘The Issue of 
Water between Israel and the Palestinians’ (Israel Water Authority, 2009), ‘The Water Issue 
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Between Israel and the Palestinians. Main Facts’ (Israel Water Authority, 2012), ‘Israel Water 
Sector, Regional Cooperation’ (Israel Water Authority, 2015), the ‘EU-Palestine Action Plan’ 
(EU, 2013) and the ‘European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine 2017-2020, Towards a 
democratic and accountable Palestinian State’ (EU, 2017).  
 
For the analysis of the Israeli discourse on the matter, the analysis of the primary sources has 
been limited by the availability of documents published in English due to my lack of knowledge 
of Hebrew, the official Israeli language used for government communication. It is very likely 
that the Water Authority published more relevant documents, whose inclusion in the analysis 
would have resulted in a more complete analysis. However, the documents used for this analysis 
have been written for an international audience specifically, among which the international 
donor community. Cascao has explained how in the case of Egypt, the Egyptian government 
uses different types of discourses for different audiences regarding its water issues.5 Therefore, 
the documents published in English by Israel are particularly relevant in this case. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the Israeli discourse on the water issue provides the basis for a 
comparison with EU policy. Throughout the analysis, attention has been paid to the ways in 
which the issue of water access for the Palestinians is being portrayed as well as how the 
relationship with the Palestinian Authority (hereafter PA) is being characterized when it comes 
to water management, in the context of the Joint Water Committee in particular.  
 
For the analysis of the Israeli discourse, attention has been paid to what extent the Israel Water 
Authority has made use of securitizing moves, knowledge construction and sanctioning the 
discourse. These discursive tactics will be explained further in the following chapter.  In order 
to avoid one of the most important pitfalls when analysing data, namely that ‘analysts project 
their own political biases and prejudices onto their data and analyse them accordingly’, my own 
research has been substantiated with secondary literature.6  
 
1.3 Contribution to the field  
 
The research contributes towards the broader academic field of hydropolitics as well. This 
thesis draws upon Marxist theories of political economy, arguing that power relations play a 
                                                
5 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, ‘’Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water 
conflicts,’’ Water Policy 8 (2006): 448. 	  
6	  Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, ‘’Critical Discourse Analysis,’’ Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 29 (2000): 455. 	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determining role in the way in which transboundary water interaction takes place. The research 
will take the Oslo agreements as a starting point rather than an outcome, to contribute to the 
growing body of literature which moves away from the excessive focus on international treaties 
as solutions to water conflicts. 
 
As such, it takes on a ‘critical’ approach to the issue. As has been explained by Jan Selby, 
critical forms of knowledge are ‘oriented towards structural explanations, and out of that 
critique, assuming the social world to be a historically constituted structured totality that must 
be understood and explained as such.’7 By explaining the discrepancy between EU rhetoric and 
practice, the case study shows that the position of the EU cannot be attributed to Israel’s 
discursive ideational alone. Due to the particular relationship between Israel and the EU, EU 
policy is predominantly influenced by Israel’s bargaining power. The fact that the EU partly 
perpetuates Israel’s discourse is merely an effect of Israel’s bargaining power. By perpetuating 
Israel’s discourse, EU policy is ultimately directed towards sustaining Israel’s hydro-
hegemony.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Jan Selby, Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Tauris, 2004), 
9.  
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2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Hydropolitics  
 
In the field of political science and international relations there is a growing body of academic 
literature on transboundary water interaction, also referred to as transboundary water 
management or transboundary water conflict/cooperation. The entire body of literature is often 
named ‘hydropolitics’.8 Due to the time and scope, the following literature review does not 
provide a complete overview of the existing literature but merely highlights the academic 
debate was well as the important works which are relevant for this thesis. To this date, there is 
no grand theory which explains transboundary water relations.9 In attempts of answering the 
question of whether the need to share water resources results in either conflict or cooperation 
between states, researchers have therefore generally adopted one of the following four main 
approaches.  
 
The first approach could be described as the realist approach. The researchers who rely upon 
realist theories argue that increasing water scarcity inevitably results in conflicts between states 
or even in so-called ‘water wars’.10 This argument is predominantly based on Malthusian 
notions of conflict. Thomas Malthus was a prominent researcher in the field of political 
economy who held the view that increasing population growth and environmental issues would 
ultimately lead to conflict between states over natural resources.11 This view is not exclusive to 
academics; in recent years the argument has been frequently adopted by politicians and 
international institutions as well. For example, both former Secretary Generals of the UN Ban 
Ki Moon and Kofi Annan have argued that water may be a cause for war in the future.12  
 
Shlomi Dinar has argued that river water is likely to stimulate war over resources between 
states.13 Critics of this approach point to the lack of empirical evidence to support this theory.14 
Mark Zeitoun has further explained why wars over water have been absent so far. He points 
                                                
8	  Naho Mirumachi, Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 18.  
9	  Naho Mirumachi, Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World, 18.  
10 Shlomi Dinar and Ariel Dinar, International Water Scarcity and Variability: Managing Resource Use Across 
Political Boundaries (University of California Press, 2016), 17.	  
11 Paula Hanasz, ‘’Understanding water cooperation and conflict,’’ Global Water Forum, last modified on 
December 2, 2013, https://globalwaterforum.org/2013/12/02/understanding-water-cooperation-and-conflict/	  
12	  Shlomi Dinar and Ariel Dinar, International Water Scarcity and Variability, 17.	  
13 Shlomi Dinar, ‘’Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation,’’ SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 234.  
14 Mark Zeitoun, Power and water in the Middle East: the hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water 
conflict (London: Tauris, 2008), 3.  
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towards the economic and strategic value of water (which is less than oil or natural gas), the 
availability of ‘virtual water’ and the power asymmetry that is often present between the states 
or entities involved.15 Most of the water available to a state is always used for the production 
of food, and it’s economic value is dependent on the value of the food it produces. The 
economic value of oil and natural gas is much higher, since it has a larger strategic importance. 
Oil and natural gas can be used for security purposes, whereas water cannot.16 Virtual water is 
a concept introduced by Tony Allan, referring to the amount of water it takes to produce a 
product such as for example wheat. When a state imports wheat, it obtains virtual water in the 
global trading system. This virtual water is ‘politically stress free’, compared to producing the 
food domestically with water coming from shared water resources. According to Allan, the 
availability of virtual water allows politicians to let water disputes with their neighbours remain 
largely unresolved.17 Due to the differences in power between the states or entities involved, 
Zeitoun has argued that ‘infinitely weaker states ‘know their place’ in their regional 
neighbourhood which further contributes to why it is not likely that water conflicts will result 
in water wars.’18 
 
The second, and arguably most popular approach in the academic literature is the liberal 
institutionalist approach. Liberal institutionalists focus on the function of (international) 
institutions and in particular on their potential role in enlarging stability among states in the 
international system. Similar to the realists, they argue that transboundary water interaction 
easily results in conflict between riparian states. However, their view is that building adquate 
institutions can help to manage shared water resources in a cooperative manner. For instance, 
in his introduction to Water Security in the Middle East. Essays in Scientific and Social 
Cooperation, Jean Axelrad Cahan has noted that ‘a consensus seems to exist that what is most 
needed are institutions that are responsible for basin-wide areas and that can sustain their 
activities during times of political or economic crisis.’19 In the same volume, Neda A. Zawahri 
argues that interstate commissions that are charged with the management of shared water 
                                                
15 Mark Zeitoun, Power and water in the Middle East: the hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water 
conflict, 3-4. 	  
16 Ibid, 3. 	  
17 Tony Allan, ‘’Watersheds and problemsheds: explaining the absence of armed conflict over water in the 
Middle East,’’ Middle East Review of International Affairs 2, no.1 (March 1998), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20061127104256/http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue1/jv2n1a7.html 
18	  Mark Zeitoun, Power and water in the Middle East: the hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water 
conflict, 4. 	  
19 Jean Axelrad Cahan, ‘’Water Security in the Middle East: A Role for the Social Sciences and Humanities,’’ in 
Water Security in the Middle East. Essays in Scientific and Social Cooperation, (Anthem Press, 2017), 5. 	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resources should be given more capabilities.20 They also emphasize the role of international 
treaties in resolving transboundary water conflicts.21 For instance, in Management of Shared 
Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an International Perspective, 
Aaron Wolf has argued that ‘despite the inherent difficulties, treaties are not only the best 
representation of local needs and settings, but they also carry the highest priority in international 
law.’22 These arguments however dismiss the fact that treaties are a product of negotiations 
between parties who often possess unequal power. Because the most powerful party has a better 
position during the negotiation process, it can use the treaty as a means to institutionalize the 
current beneficial status quo. Once in effect, the treaty can then be used as leverage over the 
weaker party.23   
 
The third approach, the Environmental Peacebuilding theory, argues the exact opposite of the 
realist approach; it focusses on the ways in which the environment (including increasing water 
scarcity) can foster peace instead of resulting in wars. The theory is based on two different 
concepts. The first concept entails the use of the environment as ‘one possible linking element 
between parties to a conflict to foster peace in an area of protracted conflict’.24 The theory is 
that the environment transcends individual interests and among other things creates a shared 
collective identity. The second concept is based on the idea that conflicts over scarcity, of water 
for instance, can be resolved through the common management of natural resources.25 This 
second concept is in line with the liberal institutionalist approach.   
 
However, in his book chapter Hydro-Apartheid and Water Access in Decolonizing Palestinian 
Political Economy (2014) Clemens Messerschmid’s arguments contradict the findings of the 
Environmental Peacebuilding theory. He has argued that in the case of trans boundary water 
allocation in Israel-Palestine the language of climate change has been adopted to shift the focus 
                                                
20 Neda A. Zawahri, ‘’Adapting to climatic variability along international river basins in the Middle East,’’ in 
Water Security in the Middle East. Essays in Scientific and Social Cooperation, (Anthem Press, 2017), 146.  
21 Jean Axelrad Cahan, ‘’Water Security in the Middle East: A Role for the Social Sciences and Humanities,’’ 
10.  
22	  Aaron T. Wolf, ‘’From Rights to Needs. Water Allocations in International Treaties,’’ in Management of 
Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an International Perspective, (Springer 
Netherlands, 2001), 149.  
23	  Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, ‘’Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water 
conflicts,’’ 447. 	  
24 EcoPeace / Friends of the Earth Middle East. ‘’Environmental Peacebuilding Theory and Practice. A Case 
Study of the Good Water Neighbours Project and In Depth Analysis of the Wadi Fukin / Tzur Hadassah 
Communities.’’ (January, 2008), accessed on May 11, 2020, 
https://ecopeaceme.org/uploads/publications_publ93_1.pdf, 12.  
25 EcoPeace / Friends of the Earth Middle East. ‘’Environmental Peacebuilding Theory and Practice,’’ 12.  
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from the fact that the central problem is political rather than environmental in nature. This way, 
the environment serves as a justification to preserve the status quo instead of making a 
contribution to solving the conflict.26 Messerschmid has argued that these water ‘myths’, as 
created by Israel, result in misguided donor interventions. According to him, Palestinians 
should ‘’engage in a battle over public opinion, both domestically and internationally, by 
critiquing the myths of ‘scarcity’ and ‘cooperation’, and exposing the reality of Israel’s hydro-
apartheid.’’27 As we will see, scarcity of water specifically is used by Israel to securitize the 
issue of sharing water with the Palestinians in an attempt to legitimize denying Palestinians  
access to adequate amounts of water.  
 
The fourth and last approach originates from the London Water Research Group, residing at 
King’s College London. Their approach to transboundary water interaction is based on the 
Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony and Marxist views of political economy.28 The scholars 
affiliated with this group are critical of the analysis of international treaties when it comes to 
shared water resources and argue that one cannot speak about cooperation ‘under circumstances 
of constrained conflict, or instances where cooperation of one party more closely resembles 
tokenism, or where cooperation is simply at the technical level.’29 They warn for against 
‘discursive mask’ of cooperation. In ‘How soft power shapes transboundary water interaction’, 
Jeroen Warner, Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi have stated that in most cases the 
interaction between states can be characterized as a mix of cooperation and conflict. Moreover, 
they argue that ‘representatives of hydro-hegemons can deny there being conflict and appear 
magnanimous, while knowing full well the odds are stacked in their favour.’30 In 
Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World, Naho Mirumachi has studied the cases 
of the Ganges River basin, the Orange-Senqu River and the Mekong waters. On the basis of 
these case studies, she has argued that one must look beyond the conceptualizations of 
cooperation and conflict available in political science and international relations, and focus on 
                                                
26 Clemens Messerschmid, ‘’Hydro-Apartheid and Water Access in Israel-Palestine: Challenging the Myths of 
Cooperation and Scarcity,’’ in Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy. De-development and Beyond, ed. 
Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 62.	  
27 Clemens Messerschmid, ‘’Hydro-Apartheid and Water Access in Israel-Palestine: Challenging the Myths of 
Cooperation and Scarcity,’’ 67-71.	  
28 Jean Axelrad Cahan, ‘’Water Security in the Middle East: A Role for the Social Sciences and Humanities,’’ 
10.	  
29	  Mark Zeitoun, Power and water in the Middle East: the hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water 
conflict, 8. 	  
30 Jeroen Warner, Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, ‘’How soft power shapes transboundary water 
interaction,’’ Global Water Forum, last modified on June 3, 2013, 
https://globalwaterforum.org/2013/06/03/6928/, 2.   
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the discursive process through which shared waters become political instead.31 Zeitoun and 
Warner have developed an alternative framework to analyse transboundary water interaction, 
which highlights hidden conflict. Based on this framework of hydro-hegemony, Paula Hanasz 
has similarly argued that ‘an arrangement understood as ‘cooperative’ from the hydro-
hegemon’s perspective may conceal its more destructive effects such as cementing an 
inequitable status quo.’32  
 
Shared water resources in the MENA region have also been a frequent subject of analysis for 
researchers assigned with the task of assessing and building theories regarding transboundary 
water interaction. Israel and the OPT are no exception; based on the approach of the London 
School there are, for instance, the important works of Miriam Lowi, Jan Selby, Mark Zeitoun 
and Clemens Messerschmid.  
 
In Water and Power. The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (1993), 
Miriam Lowi has researched the history of the interaction between these actors regarding the 
Jordan River basin highlighting its security dimensions.33 She has argued that the riparians of 
the Jordan River basin have always regarded their dispute as a dimension of the broader Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.34 Moreover, by looking at the Jordan River basin as well as other 
international river basins she has found that cooperative arrangements only exist when they are 
either advocated or imposed by the hegemon.35 This observation leaves questions as to how 
‘cooperative’ these arrangements are in practice.  
 
With his book Water, Power & Politics in the Middle East. The other Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (2004), Jan Selby gives an analysis of the breakdown of the Oslo process in 2002 
through the lens of Israeli-Palestinian water politics.36 According to Selby, ‘it is not possible to 
explain water conflicts, either in the Middle East or elsewhere, except in relation to broader 
structures and relations of politics and political economy’.37 Moreover, in his article 
‘’Cooperation, Domination and Colonisation: The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee’’, 
                                                
31	  Naho Mirumachi, Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World, 134. 	  
32	  Paula Hanasz,	  ‘’Understanding water cooperation and conflict,’’ Global Water Forum, last modified on 
December 2, 2013, https://globalwaterforum.org/2013/12/02/understanding-water-cooperation-and-conflict/ 
33 Mirjam Lowi, Water and Power. The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 2.  
34 Mirjam Lowi, Water and Power. The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, 197.  
35 Ibid, 199-200.  
36	  Jan Selby, Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East, 5.  
37 Ibid, 6.   
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Selby has analysed the record of the JWC. He has come to the conclusion that the JWC is not 
just an instrument through which Israel is able to restrict and contain Palestinian demands, but 
‘it has also facilitated Israel’s expansionist territorial and settlement interest within the West 
Bank, including through the conferral of formal PA approval on the expansion of settlement 
infrastructure.’38 
 
Mark Zeitoun has noted that his book builds upon the thesis of ‘domination dressed up as 
cooperation’ which has been introduced by Selby.39 In Power and water in the Middle East. 
The hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water conflict (2008), he has researched the power 
dynamics that have shaped the water conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority from 
the wake of the Oslo peace process up until the end of 2005, concluding that the ‘extreme 
imbalance in power between the two sides permits a highly asymmetric outcome’.40  
 
Moreover, in the article Misrepresenting the Jordan River Basin (2015), Clemens 
Messerschmid and Jan Selby have analysed the Inventory of Shared Water Resources in 
Western Asia, which was written by the UN Economic and Social Commission for West Asia 
(ESCWA), an organization of Arab states. Their conclusion is that Israel’s hegemonic hydro-
political narrative is being reproduced by the ESCWA.41 The part in the report which discusses 
the Jordan River basin overestimates the role of Israel as a contributor and the other riparians 
as exploiters. The research furthermore shows that the part on the Jordan River basin includes 
several technical errors as well. Messerschmid and Selby have argued that one of the reasons 
that ESCWA could have reproduced these Israeli narratives is ’ESCWA’s and the Middle East’s 
integration into, and dependence on, Western-dominated circuits of knowledge production.’42 
Western academics and institutions rely mostly upon Israeli representations when it comes to 
shared water resources. This thesis will demonstrate that this is true for the European Union as 
well.   
 
 
                                                
38 Jan Selby, ‘’Cooperation, Domination and Colonisation: The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee,’’ 
Walter Alternatives 6, no. 1 (2013): 21. 
39 Mark Zeitoun, Power and water in the Middle East: the hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water 
conflict, 14. 	  
40 Ibid, xiv. 	  
41 Clemens Messerschmid and Jan Selby, ‘’Misrepresenting the Jordan River Basin,’’ Water Alternatives 8, no. 2 
(2015): 258.  
42	  Clemens Messerschmid and Jan Selby, ‘’Misrepresenting the Jordan River Basin,’’ 274.  
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2.2 Hydro-hegemony and three dimensions of power  
 
In the social sciences and humanities, theory primarily serves to ‘explain a puzzle or a paradox 
where there is some aspect of the behaviour of individuals, groups or social institutions for 
which a simple explanation is not apparent.’43 The paradox central to this thesis is why the 
European Union is reinforcing Israel’s position regarding the water resources it shares with the 
Palestinians, while rhetorically supporting a two state solution. In light of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, challenging Israel’s control over water would be more in accordance with the 
European position of supporting the two-state solution. As has been explained in the 
introduction, Israeli control over Palestinian access to water is a fundamental part of the 
occupation which has an effect on the standard of living of the Palestinians and puts limits on 
the possibilities for economic development. Supporting a two-state solution in this respect 
would thus require the EU to assist the OPT in obtaining greater control over its water resources. 
Throughout the thesis, the analytical concepts of Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner’s hydro-
hegemony and Steven Lukes’ three dimensions of power provide the theoretical framework 
which allows us to understand this paradox.  
 
The framework of hydro-hegemony relies on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, which will 
be briefly discussed here first.44 Antonio Gramsci was the General Secretary of the Italian 
Communist Party and was sentenced to prison by the Fascist regime in 1926.45 While he was 
imprisoned he wrote Quaderni del carcere  (Prison notebooks), which has provided political 
theorists with the foundation of his theory on hegemony. Originally, Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony was based on domestic politics and intended to explain the relationship between the 
state and civil society. Gramsci was the first to argue that civil society is not ruled by force 
alone, but through a combination of force and ideas – coercion and consent?. Apart from using 
force, the rulers are able to impose their world view on society in order to obtain their willing 
consent for the continuation of their particular form of rule.46 In Gramsci’s view, especially 
intellectuals play a large role in this process since they ‘extend the world view of the rulers to 
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the ruled, and thereby secure the ‘’free’’ consent of the masses to the law and order of the 
land.’47  
 
Robert Cox is one of the political theorists who has further developed Gramsci’s theory in order 
to extend it from the relationship between the state and civil society and make it applicable to 
international relations as well. In short, his influential neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony 
in international relations entails ‘an expression of widely-based consent supported by material 
resources and institutions.’48 For instance, our current international system based on 
neoliberalism is sustained by international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, 
the World Bank and the United Nations. This view is distinctive from the conventional realist 
perspective on hegemony, according to which the establishment and maintenance of hegemony 
is solely based on economic and military power.49  
 
Although the term ‘hydro-hegemony’ has been in use since the 1990s, Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen 
Warner have further conceptualized it and developed a framework which allows researchers to 
‘examine the dynamics of hegemony operational at the river basin level.’50 The basis of their 
framework is that Zeitoun and Warner consider power as the determining factor to understand 
transboundary water relations between states.51 The ways in which the concept of power should 
be understood in international relations remains a large topic in academic debates.52 Filippo 
Menga has made a very useful contribution to the framework arguing that hegemony should be 
at the centre of the structure instead of power. According to Menga, the relationship between 
power and hegemony is as such that power can be considered as the means to achieve and 
maintain hegemony, rather than viewing power as an end in itself.53 This thesis relies on 
Menga’s definition of hydro-hegemony as ’the success of a basin riparian in imposing a 
discourse, preserving its interests and impeding changes to a convenient status-quo.’54  
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Zeitoun, Warner and Menga rely on the three dimensions of power as identified by Steven 
Lukes: material power, bargaining power and ideational power.55 Material power, also 
frequently referred to as ‘hard power’, refers to the material capacity to persuade the other into 
doing something against its will.56 Bargaining power is the ‘ability to control the political 
agenda and to create barriers that would impede certain issues to be discussed.’57 Lukes’ 
ideational power, based on Gramsci’s view on ruling through the imposition of ideas, is 
considered by Zeitoun and Warner as ultimately decisive in achieving and maintaining hydro-
hegemony. Menga has argued that although it indeed appears that this is the case, the different 
dimensions of power can be more or less important depending on the specific basin and the 
specific actors involved.58 
 
Based on these three dimensions, Zeitoun and Warner have further distinguished several water 
resource control strategies through which hydro-hegemony can be achieved and maintained.59 
While the framework is designed to explain inter-basin relations, it also pays attention to the 
role international actors play. The fact that these water resource control strategies can be used 
effectively by the more powerful riparian is because international law has not been sufficiently 
developed regarding this matter. The chapter which discusses Israel’s water policy will 
illustrate this further. Moreover, in order to successfully use these strategies, the more powerful 
riparian can draw upon ‘coercive resources’, such as international support.60 At the same time, 
one of the outcomes of hydro-hegemony is that (international) donors often comply with the 
existing power asymmetries.61 According to Zeitoun and Warner ‘the efforts of the international 
water community are thus steered away from the injustice and inequity endured by the non-
hegemonic states towards reinforcement of the status quo and perpetuation of the established 
discourse.’62 Through international support, international actors thus play a role in achieving 
hydro-hegemony and once it is achieved, they also help sustaining it.  
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This thesis focusses mostly on the effects of Israel’s hydro-hegemony. To illustrate how the 
European Union plays a role in enforcing Israel’s position regarding its control over water, it is 
shown that the European Union partly perpetuates Israel’s established discourse on water. 
Therefore, it is first examined how Israel has made use of what has been defined by Zeitoun 
and Warner as ‘hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms’: securitization, knowledge 
construction and sanctioned discourse. Securitization entails the framing of a certain issue in 
terms of security, which subsequently allows a state to take exceptional measures which would 
otherwise not be considered legitimate.63 Knowledge construction has been explained by 
Feitelson as ‘a normative delimitation separating the types of discourse perceived to be 
politically acceptable from those that are deemed politically unacceptable at a specific point in 
time.’64 Through this process, one type of discourse is ultimately heard above the others: the 
sanctioned discourse, which is constructed by the most powerful side.65 
 
But to fully grasp the European Union’s role, we must also consider the particular relationship 
between the European Union and Israel. While the European Union is perpetuating Israel’s 
discourse on water, ideational power alone is not sufficient in explaining why this is the case. 
According to Lukes, ‘it is important to understand that power in its more overt one- and two-
dimensional forms has all kinds of three-dimensional effects.’66 While hard power is absent 
from the relationship, the European Union and Israel do share various security and economy 
related interests. Being aware of these aspects of the relationship is necessary for a more 
complete understanding of how Israel’s hydro-hegemony is able to continue to function with 
the help of international actors. This will be the subject of the next chapter, providing the 
contextual background to the case study.  
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3. Israel and the European Union – A special relationship   
 
This chapter explains the relationship between Israel and the EU in terms of economic, strategic 
and scientific ties. Considering these dimensions of the relationship is important for our 
understanding of EU policy since all of these dimensions, albeit to a different extent, have an 
impact on EU policy-making regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
EU-Israel relations date back to the early years of the European Economic Community 
(hereafter EEC), which was established in 1958. During these years, formal relations were 
predominantly based on economic cooperation. During the 1960s and 1970s, the EEC and Israel 
signed several economic agreements that would prepare for a free trade area, among which 
most importantly the Free Trade Agreement of 1975.67 In November 1995, this agreement was 
replaced with a new trade agreement following the Oslo process. In December 1994, the 
European Council had declared that ‘Israel on account of its high level of economic 
development should enjoy special status in its relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity 
and common interest.’68 The statement came in reaction to the Oslo negotiations, which were 
initially applauded internationally as a significant step forward in finding a resolution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to the European Commission, today Israel is the country 
with the closest links to EU programmes.69 On the EU website it has been further stated that 
Israel and the EU ‘both share the same values of democracy, respect for freedom and rule of 
law and are committed to an open international economic system based on market principles.’70 
 
3.1 The EU’s megaphone diplomacy  
 
At the same time, the EU has remained vocal about the ongoing Israeli occupation and the 
continued building of illegal settlements, particularly since it has become clear that the Oslo 
process has failed. In response, Israel has frequently criticized the EU for its so-called 
megaphone diplomacy. This has led to the fact that the diplomatic relationship between the EU 
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and Israel is often being described as tense. The congratulatory message for the new Israeli 
government by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borell in May 2020 is one of the latest examples 
illustrating this tension. In his message, Borrell warned Israel to refrain from its plan for the 
illegal annexation of the Jordan Valley, which is located in the West Bank and is therefore part 
of Palestinian territory. The Israeli state has been planning the annexation, starting in July 2020, 
to further extend its formal occupation over Palestinian land. Lior Haiat, spokesperson of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, responded to Borell that ‘this ‘megaphone diplomacy’ is not a 
substitute for intimate diplomatic dialogue and will not advance the role the EU is seeking to 
fulfil.’71  
 
3.2 Refraining from sanctions   
 
Despite its frequent outspoken messages regarding Israel’s continuous breaches of international 
law, up until today the EU has however always refrained from imposing sanctions as a means 
to influence Israel’s behaviour towards the OPT.72 Ultimately, the EU’s actions have remained 
rhetorical. They should therefore only be regarded as symbolic since they effectively have no 
meaningful impact on the lives of the Palestinian people. Apart from financially supporting the 
Palestinians, the EU chooses not to endanger its relationship with Israel in order to end the 
occupation. As Bichara Khader has explained, the EU is ‘contenting itself with providing 
financial help to the Palestinians in the absence of a lasting solution.’73  
 
Further institutionalization of the ‘special’ status of Israel had long been formally put on hold 
since Israel’s Operation Cast Lead and the economic embargo it imposed on the Gaza Strip 
since 2008.74 The issue was first brought up again by the EU in 2013 when it proposed a 
‘Special Privileged Partnership’ to both Israel and the future state of Palestine on the condition 
that a final status agreement would be negotiated.75 Adopting a broader perspective on the 
multifaceted relationship between Israel and the EU however helps us to understand why the 
                                                
71 Raphael Ahren, ‘’After EU’s warnings against annexation, Israel slams ‘megaphone diplomacy’,’’ Times of 
Israel, May 19, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-eus-warnings-against-annexation-israel-slams-
megaphone-diplomacy/ 
72	  Dimitris Bouris, ‘’The European Union’s Role in the Palestinian Territory after the Oslo Accords: Stillborn 
State-building,’’ Journal of Contemporary European Research 6, no.3 (August 2010): 387.  
73 Bichara Khader, ‘’The European Union and the Palestinian question (1957-2014): the performance-
expectation gap,’’ Revista di Studi Politici Internazionali 81, no. 3 (2014): 338.  
74 Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History, (Lexington Books, 
2012), 323.	  	  
75 Oliveira Martins, ‘’Interpreting EU-Israel relations: a contextual analysis of the EU’s Special Priviledged 
Partnership proposal,’’ 151.  
	   23	  
relationship with Israel is nevertheless being perceived as ‘special’ by the EU, in spite of 
whether Israel reaches an agreement with the Palestinians.  
 
3.3 Strategic ties  
 
As has been explained by Christopher May, when one group provides for the security of another 
‘they may in the process acquire advantages in the production or consumption of wealth and 
special rights or privileges in that society.’76 The relationship between the EU and Israel is not 
guided by hard power, but by what Lukes has defined as soft ‘bargaining power’. The level of 
cooperation between the EU and Israel regarding security related matters is as such that the EU 
views Israel as one of its most important allies in the Middle East. As an example, in 2017 the 
EU bought Israeli defence equipment for a total of 1.8 billion dollars.77 But Israel’s security 
related value goes beyond arms trade alone; there are many other ways in which the Israeli state 
plays an important geopolitical role in enlarging European internal security. For instance, the 
EU is closely cooperating with Israel in the field of intelligence in order to prevent terrorists 
from carrying out planned attacks in Europe.78 
 
One key issue on the EU’s policy agenda over the last years has been migration. In order to 
prevent new waves of mass migration towards Europe, the EU has an interest in enlarging the 
stability of states in the Middle East. Migration towards Europe has been a consequence of 
several popular uprisings in the MENA region which started in 2001 and are commonly being 
referred to as the Arab Spring. In the case of Syria for example, the demonstrations have led to 
a civil war which caused many Syrians to be forced to flee towards Europe.      
 
According to Toby Greene and Jonathan Rynhold, in recent years the EU has increasingly 
valued Israel as a strategic ally in the Middle East because of the growing instability of several 
countries in the region.79 Israel has proven to be of strategic importance in this respect because 
of its military partnership with Egypt and Jordan. To Egypt especially, Israel is providing 
military support to assist the Egyptian state in combatting jihadist terrorism.80  
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Moreover, the EU and Israel have a common interest in preventing Iran from expanding its 
influence in the region.81 Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has been competing with 
Saudi Arabia over regional leadership. Western states, and most predominantly the United 
States, have imposed sanctions on the Iranian state in response to its nuclear program. The 
Israeli government especially regards Iran’s nuclear capabilities as a direct threat to the 
existence of the Israeli state. This can for instance be illustrated by Israeli prime minister 
Netanyahu’s speech before the UN General Assembly in 2014, in which he compared Iran to 
Islamic State in order to urge the member states to intensify their sanctions against the regime.82 
In fact, the EU is mostly concerned with Iran because of its alliance with Russia. Since the 
illegal annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and growing suspicions of Russia trying to influence 
western politics, the EU perceives Russia’s rising influence as a threat to its internal stability 
as well.  
 
Considering the potential spill over of regional conflicts, the EU’s financial assistance to the 
OPT is also partly based on the idea that violent resistance to the Israeli occupation could 
eventually have consequences for the security of EU member states as well. At the same time 
however, the foregoing illustrates that because of its military strength and resources Israel is a 
much larger strategic partner than the Palestinian Authority. When considering the relationship 
between Israel and the EU, one therefore cannot dismiss their shared interests in terms of 
security.    
 
3.4 Economic ties  
 
As has been referred to already in the introduction of this chapter, the economic ties between 
Israel and the EU are important to consider as well. In their statement in 1994, the European 
leaders referred to Israel’s ‘high level of economic development.’83 When it comes to trade in 
goods, the EU and Israel’s shared commitment regarding ‘an open international economic 
system based on market principles’ has resulted in the fact that the EU is Israel’s largest trading 
partner. According to the European Commission, in 2017 EU exports of goods to Israel had a 
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total value of 21,4 billion euros and EU imports amounted to 14,7 billion euros.84 Apart from 
the signing of a new aviation agreement in 2013, integration in the field of trade in financial 
services between the EU and Israel on the other hand remains limited.85  
 
The fact that both the EU and Israel have a market economy which largely focusses on 
technological development, also referred to as knowledge-based economies, is mainly reflected 
in the large number of multinational associations and institutions which hold their offices in 
Israel nowadays. Bruno Oliveira Martins has argued that political decisions are not only made 
through formal political institutions, but also through social systems that are created through 
economic cooperation. As has been explained by Martins, the intensive level of economic 
cooperation between Israel and the EU is ‘fundamental for sustaining the relationship when 
political problems escalate.’86  
 
Following the Oslo process, Israel and the EU signed a new trade agreement in November 1995, 
entering into force in 2000.87 According to Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, the new trade 
agreement did not impose any conditions on Israel to end the occupation.88 The only issue has 
been regarding the principles of the rules of origin, which define ‘whether a particular product 
originates in one of the countries party to a free trade agreement, and hence whether the exporter 
is entitled to tariff concessions granted under the free trade agreement.’89 In 2019, the European 
Court of Justice ruled that products made in the illegal Israeli settlements should be labelled as 
such as they do not originate from the state of Israel, and will therefore not fall under the trade 
agreement.90 As has been explained by Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo however, ‘the 
application of the ROO has had no tangible impact on this industry, on the Israeli economy as 
a whole, or even the settlement project in particular.’91 This is because companies operating 
from the settlements have used different strategies to avoid the measures, such as using other 
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companies to transport the goods or falsely labelling the goods as produced in Israel.92 Again, 
this is a measure which only contributes to what is often named the EU’s ‘normative power’; 
in reality, the economic stakes are too high to formulate policies which would effectively force 
Israel to change its politics.  
 
3.5 Scientific ties  
 
As the only non-European country, Israel has been a part of the EU’s Framework Programme 
for Research and Tenchical Development since 1996.93 According to Arie Reich, ‘Israel’s 
special status in these programmes is the result of its high level of scientific and research 
capability and the dense network of long-standing relations in scientific and technical 
cooperation between Israel and the EU.’94  
 
The EU measures taken regarding the most recent R&D programme called ‘’Horizon 2020’’, 
with an estimated budget of around 80 billion euros, illustrate how much the EU values Israel’s 
contribution in this field. Leading up to the programme, the EU for the first time prohibited that 
any funds would go to projects located in the occupied territories. Similar to the measures taken 
regarding the rules of origin of Israeli goods, this measure was mainly rhetorical since it had 
little effect on the granting of funds for research. Arie Reich has explained that in practice, only 
Ariel University is now prohibited to apply for funding as a result of the measure, since it is the 
only university outside of the 1967 border. This has not made a real difference, because Ariel 
university had never been permitted to apply for any of the programmes before either.95  
 
According to Rory Miller, even though diplomatic relations between the EU and Israel have 
been increasingly tense over the last few years, cooperation in R&D has thus not been affected 
but merely increased instead.96 Miller has argued that this shows that Israel has been able to 
‘separate its political relations from its economic relations with the EU – something that 
successive Israeli governments since the 1970s have sought to achieve.’97 However, in fact the 
exact opposite is true; Israel’s shared security interests, together with its value as a market 
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economy and its significant contribution to science and technology related EU programmes 
constitute important factors which influence EU policy-making. Therefore, EU policy 
regarding the issue of water between Israel and the OPT cannot be regarded as an isolated issue, 
but should be considered in this light as well. The different dimensions sustaining EU-Israel 
relations together provide for Israel’s bargaining power regarding the EU when it comes to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following chapters will show that Israel’s bargaining power has 
resulted in the fact that EU policy regarding transboundary water resources in the OPT complies 
with the existing power asymmetry.    
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4. The issue of water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Basin formations and water levels in the Coastal aquifer and the Mountain aquifers98 
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This chapter discusses the lack of a fair access to shared water resources for the Palestinians in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as part of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The chapter 
consists of an overview of the current situation, followed by an explanation through the analysis 
of the historical power dissimilarities between Israel and the Palestinians. The analysis starts 
out with a brief historical background regarding the beginning of the Israeli occupation as a 
result of the Six-Day War of 1967, during which Israel took control over all the shared water 
resources. This historical background allows us to understand the existing power dynamics 
between the two parties leading up to the Oslo negotiations and how this significant difference 
in power became manifested during these negotiations. It will be argued that the agreements 
laid down in the Oslo Accords should be viewed as the outcome of a process of negotiations 
determined by this unequal power relationship.   
 
Up until today, transboundary water interaction between Israel and the West Bank is regulated 
under the Oslo II Interim Agreement of 1995 (hereafter Oslo II). The research will show that 
Oslo II effectively institutionalized Israel’s control over water, including through the creation 
of the Joint Water Committee (hereafter JWC), which has been detrimental to Palestinian access 
to the resource.99 Throughout the analysis it will become clear that the effects of Oslo II on 
transboundary water resources should be seen as an example of what has been argued by Adam 
Hanieh, namely that ‘Oslo presented itself as the ideal tool to fortify Israel’s control over 
Palestinians and simultaneously strengthen its position within the broader Middle East. There 
was no contradiction between support for the ‘’peace process’’ and deepening colonization – 
the former consistently worked to enable the latter.’ 100  
 
This chapter thereby focusses on an important tactic deployed by Israel to sustain its hydro-
hegemony; the signing of treaties as a means to maintain the status quo.101 According to Zeitoun 
and Warner, treaties which reflect existing inequalities can be used by the stronger party to gain 
leverage over the weaker party thus resulting in a tool for domination.102 Together with Israel’s 
deployment of discursive tactics, which will be the subject of the next chapter, the following 
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analysis provides the background on the basis of which we can examine the role of the EU in 
sustaining Israel’s hydro-hegemony through its donor assistance regarding the OPT.   
 
4.1 Access to water for the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip  
 
As has been mentioned above, transboundary water interaction between Israel and Gaza has 
not been regulated by Oslo II. For this reason and because Israel treats the West Bank and Gaza 
as two distinct territories, the situation in Gaza will be discussed here separately. According to 
Jan Selby, this lack of regulation has resulted in the fact that ‘the one Palestinian territory which 
is incapable of being water resource self-sufficient – because of its low resource base combined 
with dense refugee population – is effectively compelled to be just that.’103 According to a 
recent publication by the World Bank, the amount of water available for domestic consumption 
in Gaza is 89 liters per capita per day (lcd), while the benchmark minimum set by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) is 100 lcd.104 
 
The transboundary water resource underlying parts of the Gaza Strip is the Coastal Aquifer. 
Israel unilaterally manages the parts of the Coastal Aquifer regarding Israeli territory, while the 
PA is responsible for the management of water regarding the area in Gaza under its control. 
Because Israel is the upstream riparian to the Coastal Aquifer, extraction by Israel has 
consequences for the supply available to the Palestinians.105 The lack of regulation means that 
the PA effectively has no authority to limit Israel’s increase of using water from the resource.106 
Because the Coastal Aquifer is the only source of water for the Palestinians living in Gaza, they 
have resorted to over-extraction of the resource. This over-extraction has resulted in the fact 
that 90-95% of the water supply in Gaza has now become unsuitable to drink because it has 
been contaminated by seawater intrusion and sewage pollution.107 Because there is not enough 
water available through the Coastal Aquifer, another coping strategy used by the population is 
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to buy water which comes from unregulated wells and is being desalinated by private 
desalination plants or at home. Amnesty International has noted however that this water may 
still be contaminated.108 Because of these issues, the current situation in Gaza is being described 
as a ‘water crisis’.109 Since Israel’s blockade on Gaza, which started in 2007 when Hamas was 
elected as the Palestinian leadership party, the situation has become even worse because Israel 
is denying supplies necessary for water management to enter the territory. Apart from that, 
Israel denies the transfer of water from the West Bank to Gaza as well.110 
 
4.2 Access to water for the Palestinians living in the West Bank  
 
The transboundary water resources of the West Bank are the Jordan River and the Mountain 
aquifer. The Mountain aquifer is the collective name for the North Eastern, Eastern and Western 
aquifers.111 Since the start of the Israeli occupation over the West Bank, the Palestinian 
population has been denied access to the Jordan River, which leaves the Mountain aquifer as 
the only shared water resource.112 The following table by Amnesty International shows how 
water allocation from transboundary water resources has been regulated under Oslo II (in 
million cubic metres per year):  
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Figure 1: Shared Water Resources. Allocations as codified in the Oslo Accords113 
 
As has been noted by Clemens Messerschmid, Israeli future needs have not been specified in 
the agreements, ‘which in effect has meant that they are unlimited.’114 On the other hand, 
Palestinian future needs have been specified at 78 MCM. Currently, the amount of water 
available for domestic consumption for Palestinians in the West Bank is around 60-70 lcd. 
According to Amnesty International, the amount of water available is so low due to leakages 
which are difficult to fix because of ‘the restrictions on Palestinians’ movements and other 
obstacles imposed by Israel, including the requirement that permits be obtained form the Israeli 
army for even small development projects.’115 Israel allows the PA to extract 20% of what has 
been determined as the estimated potential of the Mountain Aquifer, which has been around 
113.4 MCM in 2016.116 At the same time, World Bank data shows that Israel has allocated 664 
MCM of water from the Mountain Aquifer for Israeli use in 2011 (Israeli data from 2016 was 
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not available).117 According to the World Bank, for additional water the Palestinians have to 
rely on buying bulk water from Israel’s national water company Mekorot. This has left the 
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) increasingly in debt to Israel.118 Apart from these issues, 
Israel’s’ policy of encouraging the building of settlements is constituting a threat to Palestinian 
access to water as well. In March 2012, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has published a document on this issue. According to the 
OCHA, in recent years Israeli settlers have increasingly successfully adopted methods of 
intimidation as well as the erection of fences in order to take over water springs belonging to 
Palestinian privately owned land.119 
 
Regarding shared water resource management of the Mountain Aquifer, article 40 of Oslo II 
provided the legal basis for the creation of a Joint Water Committee. On the basis of principle 
11 of this article, the JWC was created with its function ‘’to deal with all water and sewage 
related issues in the West Bank.’’ Principle 13 further states that ‘’The JWC shall be comprised 
of an equal number of representatives from each side.’’ Most importantly, principle 14 states 
that ‘’All decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including the agenda, its 
procedures and other matters.’’120 Through these principles, Oslo II has created the impression 
that trans boundary water interaction between Israel and the Palestinian Authority can be 
characterized as cooperative. Several authors and institutions have however argued that in 
reality, this form of ‘cooperation’ more closely resembles domination. For instance, Jan Selby 
has analysed the record of the JWC during the period 1995-2008. He has shown that in practice, 
‘’the Palestinian Authority has been compelled to lend its formal approval to the large-scale 
expansion of Israeli settlement water infrastructures, activity which is both illegal under 
international law and one of the major impediments to Palestinian statehood.’’121 In its sector 
note from April 2009 on Palestinian water development, the World Bank has similarly 
concluded that ‘’the JWC does not function as a ‘’joint’’ water resource governance institution 
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because of fundamental asymmetries – of power, of capacity, of information, of interests – that 
prevent the development of a consensual approach to resolving water management 
conflicts.’’122 Moreover, the World Bank report states that ‘’Israel has de-facto maintained 
predominance over the allocation and management of West Bank water resources.’’123 
Additionally, when projects are intended for Area C of the West Bank (60% of the territory), 
they require additional approval from the Israeli Civil Administration because this area falls 
under Israeli authority.124    
 
4.3 Historical background 
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, both Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasser and 
the Ba’ath party in Syria attempted to use the Palestinian cause to claim leadership over the 
Arab world.125 Despite their competition, they formed a military pact together with Jordan. 
Increasing tensions between Egypt, Syria and Jordan on one side and Israel on the other led to 
a confrontation between Syria and Israel in the Golan Heights in April 1967. Provocations by 
Syria resulted in retaliation by the Israeli army, upon which Nasser reoccupied the Sinai 
Peninsula. A few days later, on June 5, Israel decided to launch a pre-emptive war on its Arab 
neighbours. Due to the fact that Israel could make use of superior western arms, the war only 
lasted six days after which Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza Strip as 
well as East Jerusalem. 
 
Israel’s Military Orders of 1967 have provided the foundation for the current situation in the 
OPT. By imposing Military Order No. 92, Israel took control over all the water resources in the 
territories. Subsequently, Military Order No. 158 imposed a permit system, entailing that water 
sector development of any kind should first be subjected for approval by the Israeli army.126 In 
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1982 the Israeli army was replaced by the Israeli Civil Administration, but the Military Orders 
remained in effect.127  
 
In 1973, on the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria started a new war against Israel 
to recapture the territories gained by Israel during the Six-Day War.128 Israel won the war 
without losing any of the occupied territories, aided by military support from the United States 
and the Netherlands. Over the course of the 1960s, a close relationship between Israel and the 
United States had already began to form. 129 In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, the United 
States desired to take a central role in solving the Middle East conflict.   
 
4.4 The Oslo process  
 
The first significant initiative to this end were the Madrid talks. These negotiations were 
initiated by the United States and cosponsored by the Soviet Union, who organized a peace in 
Madrid in 1991 between the state of Israel and a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. The PLO 
was not allowed to take part in these negotiations, because the United States had previously 
suspended their contacts with the organization as a result of the use of violence on the 
Palestinian side. The Madrid talks failed to produce any meaningful results towards a peace 
accord however. The main reason for the failure of the Madrid talks was the fact that the 
Palestinian delegates refused to give up their position that a Palestinian state would be one of 
the outcomes of the negotiations. The Israeli delegates on the other hand were not prepared to 
recognize the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. Moreover, the Palestinian 
delegates demanded that the Israeli settlements would be addressed as well as the future status 
of East Jerusalem, which is recognized as occupied territory under international law. The Israeli 
negotiators were afraid that addressing these issues would result in too much domestic 
opposition.130  
 
Because the Madrid talks did not appear to be fruitful, Israel and the PLO started a separate 
process of negotiations in December 1992 which were free from American involvement. These 
negotiations were the beginning of the Oslo process and took place in and around Oslo between 
                                                
127 Clemens Messerschmid, ‘’Hydro-Apartheid and Water Access in Israel-Palestine: Challenging the Myths of 
Cooperation and Scarcity,’’ 55.  
128 Peter Malcontent, Nederland, Israël & Palestina. Een open zenuw, 79.	  
129 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2017), 275.    
130 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents 419-421.  
	   36	  
December 1992 and August 1993.131 According to Daniel Lieberfeld, even besides their 
military, diplomatic, and economic advantages, Israel had a considerable better position in the 
negotiations during this process than the PLO. Based on the memoirs of several high-placed 
officials involved in the negotiations, Lieberfeld. has argued that the PLO sought direct talks 
with Israel because it was at a risk of financial collapse. At the same time, Hamas was gaining 
more support among the Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank which undermined the 
PLO’s legitimacy. As a result of these issues, recognition by Israel and the United States was 
perceived by the PLO as a crucial strategy to be able to survive as an organization. At the same 
time, the Israeli government was in favour of direct talks with the PLO because they wanted to 
prevent Hamas, from gaining more power as well.132 They were also aware of the difficult 
position the PLO found itself in; Shimon Peres, the foreign minister of Israel at the time, noted 
in his memoirs that ‘’The reports from Oslo indicated that the PLO was in serious difficulties, 
both financial and political, and the time was therefore right for Israel to clinch a deal with the 
organization.’’133 Both parties were interested in keeping the negotiations a secret to prevent 
loss of domestic support and the possibility of opponents undermining the process. Moreover, 
organizing the negotiations in secret meant that they could avoid close scrutiny by the media 
and therefore did not have to ‘’grandstand and speak mainly for the benefit of domestic 
audiences.’’134  
 
This considerable difference in power between the two parties explains the outcome of the 
negotiations. The first tangible result of the Oslo process were the letters of mutual recognition, 
which were signed in September 1993 by Yitzhak Rabin as the prime minister of Israel and 
Yasir Arafat as the chairman of the PLO. As has been explained by Charles D. Smith, there was 
no ‘’mutual’’ recognition in practice. Yasir Arafat signed an agreement which stated that the 
PLO formally recognized the state of Israel and that it would now denounce the use of violence 
in its charter. On the Israeli side, Yitzhak Rabin only recognized the PLO as the political 
representative of the Palestinian people however.135 With his letter, Israel did not recognize the 
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Palestinian right to self-determination and neither did they promise a Palestinian state during 
the process of negotiation.  
 
The second outcome of the Oslo process was the Declaration of Principles (DoP), which had 
been conditional upon the signing of the letters of mutual recognition. Concerned with its 
domestic constituency, the Israeli representatives had made sure that the most pressing issues 
were excluded from the agreement: the status of East Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, Palestinian 
statehood, territorial borders, the question of return of the Palestinian refugees.136 The issue of 
trans boundary water resources was left out of the negotiations as well. Instead, this declaration 
provided the basis for the creation of the Palestinian Authority (then referred to as the 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority). The idea was that this organization would 
become the governing body of the Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank for a 
transitional period of no more than five years.137 By laying down the PA’s governing authority 
in an international agreement both Israel and the PLO wanted to limit the influence of Hamas, 
which would consequently be left with no legal basis to represent the Palestinian people.138  
 
It was further decided that permanent status negotiations would begin within three years after 
the election of the Palestinian Authority.139 One of the consequences for the Palestinian 
territories was that immediately after the DoP, the European Union released an aid package for 
the Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank. After the signing of Oslo II, in December 
1996 this was followed by the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade 
and Cooperation between the European Commission and the Palestinian Authority.140  
 
If one looks at the immediate consequences of Oslo I it becomes clear that signing this 
agreement had a lot more benefits for the Israeli side however. Oslo I was initially welcomed 
internationally as a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The agreements were 
regarded as a meaningful step towards what would ultimately result in the two-state solution 
whereby an autonomous state of Palestine would be able to peacefully co-exist with the state 
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of Israel, despite the fact that the reality of the agreements was a lot different. Following the 
signing of the Oslo Accords, Arab governments lifted their boycotts and started economic and 
political relations with Israel. Jordan and Israel signed an official peace accord in 1994, 
whereby Israel also granted Jordan a ‘’special role’’ regarding the permanent status negotiations 
over Jerusalem. Western governments were less reluctant to invest in the Israeli economy, no 
longer afraid of Arab boycotts.141 According to Joel Peters the EU welcomed the Oslo Accords, 
‘’seeing it as a vindication of the principles and policies they had been advocating throughout 
the previous decade.’’142 The EU had urged Israel to include the PLO in any future negotiation 
process and had advocated for a just resolution, including that ‘the Palestinian people be 
allowed to exercise fully its rights to self-determination.’143 While this was not the case with 
the Oslo Accords, for Israel it nevertheless meant that the government could sign a new trade 
agreement with Europe, because the European heads of state now declared that Israel ‘’should 
enjoy special status in its relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and common 
interest.’’144 
 
The permanent status negotiations were concluded in September 1995, when the PLO and the 
Israeli government signed the Oslo II Interim Agreement. The negotiations leading up to the 
agreement and the agreement itself were met with a lot of resistance on both sides. This time, 
the negotiations focussed on all the issues which were left out of the DoP, among which the 
issue of shared water resources.145 Oslo II was intended to serve as an interim agreement until 
permanent status negotiations would lead to the Permanent Status Agreement. The preamble to 
Oslo II stated that these negotiations should start not later than May 4, 1996.146 In 2000, the 
permanent status negotiations at Camp David however failed and the Second Intifada broke 
out.147 As a consequence of this, many of the principles of the interim agreement are still in 
place today. At the same time, the Israeli occupation over Palestinian territory has remained 
and Israel has continued with its policy of encouraging the building of settlements. Therefore 
Oslo II is now frequently regarded as a failure.148 
                                                
141 Adam Hanieh, ‘’The Oslo Illusion,’’ Jacobin, April 21, 2013, https://jacobinmag.com 
142 Joel Peters, ‘’Europe and the Israel-Palestinian peace process: the urgency of now,’’ European Security 19, 
no. 3 (2010): 514.	  
143 Ibid, 513.  
144 Ibid, 515.	  
145 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents, 445-446.  
146 United Nations Security Council, ‘’Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip,’’ September 28, 1995, 8. https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloII95 
147 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents, 482.   
148	  Adam Hanieh, ‘’The Oslo Illusion,’’ Jacobin, April 21, 2013, https://jacobinmag.com	  
	   39	  
 
 International donors remain committed to supporting the ‘’peace process’’ however and base 
their policies and funding on the principles set out by this agreement. International development 
aid towards the OPT significantly increased after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo 
Agreements. Similarly, the number of NGOs working in the OPT grew dramatically and 
became largely dependent on conditional international funding.149 Regarding transboundary 
water interaction, this means that in practice funding is allocated on the basis of JWC approval. 
The result of this conditional international funding is that the Palestinian Authority as well as 
Palestinian NGOs can no longer challenge the political and economic status quo.150 According 
to Lama Arda and Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, ‘the Oslo Accords transformed the politics of 
anti-colonial struggle to a developmental aid regime and consequent normalization of 
occupation.151  
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5. Sharing water resources with the Palestinians – The Israeli discourse 
 
The focus of this chapter is Israel’s discourse on water and the water resources it shares with 
the OPT. Using my own discourse analysis accompanied by secondary literature, the following 
part discusses the discursive tactics employed by Israel as the hydro-hegemon: securitizing 
moves, knowledge construction and sanctioning the discourse. This strategy can be considered 
successful once other actors take over the hegemon’s discourse, consequently allowing the most 
powerful actor, in this case Israel, to maintain the status quo of controlling the shared water 
resources.   
 
 Three documents on the matter published by the Israel Water Authority (hereafter Water 
Authority) have been used to examine the ways in which the issue of water is being portrayed 
as well as how the relationship with the Palestinian Authority is being characterized regarding 
transboundary water management, in the context of the JWC in particular. The first document 
is titled ‘The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians’. It was published by the Water 
Authority in March 2009 and presented as ‘a policy paper, prepared at the request of the Water 
Authority by a group of independent experts.’152 The second document by the organization is a 
presentation prepared by Israel for the 7th edition of the World Water Forum which took place 
in 2015 in South Korea, titled ‘Israel Water Sector. Regional Cooperation’. The last document 
is a presentation named ‘The Water Issue Between Israel and the Palestinians. Main Facts’, 
published by the Water Authority in February 2012. The publications were chosen on the basis 
of their accessibility and due to the specific position the Water Authority holds among other 
Israeli institutions and ministries involved in the water sector. Before the analysis, it is therefore 
necessary to provide some background information on the creation of the Water Authority.   
 
5.1 The Israel Water Authority  
 
As stated on the official website of the Israeli government, since it’s establishment in 2007 the 
Water Authority is the professional government entity in the water and sewage sector under 
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which the management and supervision authorities are unified.153 The Water Authority was 
established following the report of a parliamentary inquiry. In June 2001, the Knesset (the 
legislative body of the Israeli state) decided upon a parliamentary committee of inquiry to 
investigate the Israeli water sector. One year later, this committee issued a report in which they 
advocated setting up a central authority in the field of water. According to the committee, 
different ministries are involved in the Israeli water sector; most notably the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.154 The committee has 
noted that especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has played a large role in regional 
cooperation activities, ‘’not always in full cooperation with the other factors in the economy, 
that deal with the water issue.’’155 One can conclude from this that the internal Israeli water 
discourse is not homogenous, due to the different interests of the different ministries. This 
conclusion is shared by Feitelson, who has argued that the water discourse has become 
particularly fragmented over the last decade.156 For instance, according to the committee the 
Ministry of Finance has acted on ‘narrow accountancy principles, that do not take into 
consideration non-economic interests, such as ideology or foreign policy interests.’157 
Stemming from the years before the creation of the Israeli state, for many Israeli’s water has an 
ideological value as well. From the Zionist perspective, control over water resources was 
regarded as necessary in relation to future state-building efforts. According to Feitelson, 
agriculture was seen by the Zionists as ‘an element for increasing the productivity and changing 
the employment base of the Jewish people, and contributing to nation building by creating 
closer links between the recently arrived new immigrants and their ancient homeland.’158 This 
Zionist perspective on water remained particularly influential until the 1967, after which Israel 
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took control over all the shared water resources.159 But even today, the agricultural lobby in 
Israel remains strong and often conflicts with the Ministry of Finance.160  
 
In spite of the the Israeli water sector being internally divided, the establishment of the Israel 
Water Authority created the image that a politically neutral position is possible when it comes 
to issues of water. The committee proposed that ‘’the authority should be incorporated, and not 
subject to any Ministry, and its function should be to manage, regulate and direct the water 
sector, on the national and regional levels, in accordance with the instructions of the Water 
Authority Law that will be enacted, with the policy of the Government and the 
recommendations of the Water Council as constituted. The Authority will be headed by a 
professional in the sphere of water, who does not represent any particular interest in the water 
sector, and who will be appointed by the Government.’’161 With this proposal the committee 
essentially advocated for the Israeli government to adopt a more technical perspective on the 
water issue. By focussing on technological and economic inefficiencies, as well as 
mismanagement, the new Water Authority could present a view which largely denies how in 
reality the issue is determined by the uneven and unequitable distribution of wealth, power and 
resources.162 The following analysis is based on the assumption that today the Water Authority 
represents the dominant external Israeli discourse on water and will show that the discourse 
indeed fails to adequately represent the political reality.    
 
5.2 Water as a scarce resource 
 
In the Israeli discourse, water is presented as a scarce resource. For example, in the introduction 
of the policy paper it can be read that ‘most countries in the Middle East suffer from an ongoing 
shortage of water. The situation is felt most acutely in Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority, and is worsening due to the decrease in useable water reserves as a result of pollution 
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and climatic changes, as well as population growth and the rising demand of water.’163 
Similarly, the first slide of the presentation for the 7th World Water Forum in 2015 emphasizes 
the shortage of water in the region. The slide compares water withdrawal as a percentage of the 
total amount of water available in the world between 1995 and 2025. Moreover, it is mentioned 
that ‘’45% of the world population will be living in countries chronically short of water by 
2050. In the Middle East it is a well known reality!’’.164 Samer Alatout has however shown that 
water scarcity has only been the dominant Israeli discourse since the 1950s, serving as a 
justification for Israel’s policies regarding access to water for the Palestinians. According to 
Alatout, before the creation of the Israeli state ‘the initial politicization of water in Zionist 
context enrolled a narrative of abundance rather than scarcity.’165 Although it is true that 
environmental factors play a role in water issues in the Middle East, scarcity thus easily serves 
as a justification for certain policies while in reality it is far from the determining factor.    
 
The fact that water is being presented as a scarce resource creates room for the issue of water 
to be constructed as a matter of security, which is considered a securitizing move. This is visible 
in the Israeli discourse as well, where allocating more water to one party is being equalled to 
water loss for the other party. In the policy paper, there are several instances where water 
allocation to the Palestinians is being described as ‘at the expense of’ Israel. One example can 
be found in the chapter Water rights as perceived by the Palestinians, which concludes that 
‘The Palestinians are clearly endeavouring to arrive at solutions that will be primarily at the 
expense of Israel, which is suffering from severe water scarcity and is making intensive efforts 
to bring about efficient and responsible utilization of its scarce natural resources.’166 Moreover, 
the Palestinian position is being explained in short by the Water Authority as ‘Give us (Israel 
to the Palestinians) all the fresh water we need for the present and the future, take (Israel from 
the Palestinians) the wastewater that we generate, and desalinate seawater in place of the water 
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we are taking from you.’167 Another example relates to the northern and eastern basin of the 
Mountain Aquifer, to which resources the Water Authority claims that Israel has a ‘natural 
right’. According to Fröhlich, invoking the term ‘rights’ can be considered a securitizing move, 
because ‘if my rights are threatened, my self-determination is in danger.’ This results in the 
idea that exclusive control over the resources is necessary in order to secure Israel’s water 
rights.168 
 
Using a discourse which emphasizes that water is a scarce resrouce ultimately creates a zero-
sum game when it comes to water allocation. The observation that the Israeli discourse on water 
focusses on water scarcity is shared by Messerschmid, who has further argued that this type of 
discourse results in the belief that the way in which water is being allocated in the region is 
largely beyond Israeli control.169 As has already been described in the previous chapter, Israel 
has been able to institutionalize the unequal distribution of water between Israel and the OPT 
based on this rationale. Zeitoun, Messerschmid and Attili have however shown that in fact Israel 
is very much in control when it comes water allocation and groundwater abstraction, since it is 
able to use a double standard in order to maintain minimal levels of Palestinian water 
consumption. On the one side, in Israel ‘the flows are competed for internally by the famers for 
crops, water resource managers, the Ministries of Infrastructure and Finance, and 
environmental groups’.170 When it comes to the Palestinians however, Israel only regards their 
needs under economic arrangements.171 
 
Based on interviews with Israeli water experts, Fröhlich has further argued that the experts 
identify themselves as part of the academic community and often accuse Israeli politicians for 
securitizing water while viewing themselves as de-securitising actors.172 The documents by the 
Water Authority nevertheless show that experts in the field of water can be securitizing actors 
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as well. The foregoing examples of securitizing moves distinguished in the documents together 
with the fact that the policy paper is being presented as written by independent experts is an 
illustration of Gramsci’s view regarding the role of intellectuals in extending the discourse of 
the rulers on to those who are ruled. In this case, the experts play a large role in perpetuating 
the discourse that access to water for the Palestinians should be limited on the basis of water 
scarcity, resulting in the idea that this knowledge is commonsensical. 
 
Following from this, it is mentioned in the policy paper that the solution of giving the 
Palestinian Authority more control over the shared water resources is ‘utterly unacceptable.’173 
Deeming one solution in the conflict unacceptable by experts should be characterized as 
constructed knowledge, which has been explained by Feitelson as ‘a normative delimitation 
separating the types of discourse perceived to be politically acceptable from those that are 
deemed politically unacceptable at a specific point in time.’174 The main argument is thus that 
due to the scarcity of water, Israel cannot allow the Palestinians to exercise more control over 
the shared water resources. Deeming this solution as unacceptable is based on the rationale that 
one who would propose such a solution denies the fact that water is a scarce resource.  
 
5.3 Future needs of the Palestinians  
 
When it comes to water management between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the Water 
Authority often refers to Oslo II as the basis for mutual obligations. In the policy paper, Oslo II 
is being described as a ‘practical, imaginative and just agreement.’175 In the presentation titled 
The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians – Main Facts, which was published in 
February 2012, Oslo II is used as a starting point to describe the relationship between the two 
actors. The agreement is mainly referred to as a means to show that Israel has fulfilled (and 
even exceeded) its obligation of providing the amount of water which was specified as the 
estimated needs of the Palestinian people. In the presentation it is stated that ‘Israel has made 
available approximately 70 MCM/year of water to the Palestinians in the West Bank during the 
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interim period, even though the Water Agreement allocates a much smaller quantity of only 
23.6 MCM/year (for the West Bank).’ Similarly, it is noted that Israel exceeds its obligation to 
supply water to the Palestinians in Gaza by 21 MCM/year.176 What is downplayed however is 
that at the same time, Israel has violated Oslo II by over abstracting 260 MCM/year for Israeli 
use alone.177  
 
Zeitoun has termed the Israeli discourse on transboundary water management with the 
Palestinians as a ‘Needs, not Rights’ discourse.178 According to Zeitoun, ‘the pragmatic attitude 
of proponents of the Needs, not Rights discourse can be encapsulated as follows: ‘there is not 
enough water for all of us, so let’s not talk about water rights. Let’s cooperate to make the best 
of the situation.’179 In both of the presentations as well as the policy paper which were used for 
this analysis, the Water Authority states that Palestinian water rights are being recognized, but 
will be negotiated in the permanent status agreement. But with the current political climate of 
continued occupation, and Israeli plans for the formal annexation of the Jordan Valley, 
permanent status negotiations are not expected to take place anytime soon.   
 
Besides this statement, the Israeli discourse can indeed be characterized as one of Palestinian 
needs instead of rights. However, based on the policy paper it seems that this position is justified 
by the Water Authority by referring to international law rather than water scarcity. The experts 
address the frequently heard reference to Palestinian water rights, arguing that ‘it should be 
noted that this term is not defined under international law, although it is assumed that the 
intention is to refer to the rights of States under the rules and principles referred to above.’180 
The position thus appears to be that since there is no autonomous Palestinian state, the 
Palestinian people have no legitimate right to water. Simone Klawitter has noted that the right 
to water has also been recognized as a human right in the International Covenant on Economic, 
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Social and Cultural Rights.181 This means that Palestinian individuals have a right to ‘sufficient, 
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses’ as 
well.182 Up until today, Israel has been able to avoid the consequences of continuously 
breaching international law.  
 
5.4 The Joint Water Committee 
 
Like the Oslo agreement, the JWC is often referred to by the Water Authority as well in order 
to describe its relationship with the Palestinians when it comes to sharing water resources. Both 
of the presentations which were used contain the same information on the JWC.  The activities 
of the JWC are outlined and it is emphasised that almost all of the project applications which 
are brought before the JWC are approved. The Israeli discourse on the JWC focusses on the 
cooperative nature of the organization, despite the fragile political environment it operates in.183  
 
According to the Water Authority, the fact that a lot of projects have not been implemented 
does not stem from a lack of approval by the JWC but from the fact that the Palestinians have 
not carried out the approved projects.184 The presentations also mention the drilling of 
unauthorized wells by the Palestinians, which have caused an ‘’ecological disaster’’ in the case 
of Gaza.185 In the policy paper, poor management on behalf of the Palestinians is mentioned 
more extensively; in fact, the larger body of the paper deals with this topic. It is also frequently 
stated that the Palestinian failure to implement the projects cannot be explained by a lack of 
funding. For example, it is argued that ‘’Even though the donor countries have expressed their 
readiness to fully fund the construction of wastewater treatment plants for all major Palestinian 
cities, only one such plant has been constructed on the Palestinian side (at El-Bireh).’’186 On 
the unapproved wells that are being drilled by Palestinians, the Water Authority states that ‘’the 
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Palestinians routinely state that the unapproved wells are affecting them as well and that they 
too are trying to combat the phenomenon. However, in fact nothing concrete has been done by 
them to stop the incidents, which constitute a serious violation of the Water Agreement.’’187 
Next to the drilling of unapproved wells, the lack of wastewater treatment by the Palestinians 
is one of the issues most frequently mentioned in the paper. In the chapter Principal 
Conclusions Regarding Implementation of the Water Agreement, the assessment of the experts 
is summarized as ‘Israel has met all its obligations’ while ‘the Palestinians are seriously 
defaulting’.188 As has been mentioned in this chapter already, Israel frequently violates Oslo II 
by abstracting more water from the Western aquifer than has been agreed upon.189 Emphasizing 
Israel’s will to cooperate while downplaying its violations has been explained by Zeitoun and 
Warner as sanctioning the discourse; ‘to veil certain aspects of riparian relations (e.g. 
inequitable distribution) while emphasising others (e.g. the merits of technical cooperation).’190  
 
This chapter has described the Israeli discourse on water through an analysis of publications by 
the Water Authority. The analysis has shown that the Israeli discourse on water entails 
presenting water as a scarce resource, which has led to securitizing moves, constructed 
knowledge and sanctioning the discourse. By means of these discursive tactics Israel attempts 
to justify its unequal distribution of water between Israeli’s and Palestinians. Besides the 
general discourse on water, specific attention has been paid to the Israeli discourse on 
transboundary water magagement. It was found that Oslo II and the creation of the JWC are 
referred to by the Water Authority in order to describe the relationship between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority as cooperative from the Israeli side, while attributing any issues in the 
relationship to poor management and lack of will on behalf of the Palestinians. The following 
chapter focusses on EU policy regarding donor funding for Palestinian water projects in order 
to examine the extent to which Israel’s discourse is being perpetuated.  
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6. How EU policy is reinforcing Israeli control over transboundary water 
resources 
 
This chapter describes the evolvement of the position of the EU towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and subsequently provides an analysis of different EU policy documents regarding 
transboundary water management between Israel and the OPT as well as the EU’s financial 
assistance to the Palestinians regarding this issue. The official position of the EU on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict can be summed up as supporting the two-state solution. According to the 
European Commission, in order to reach the goal of the two-state solution EU policies regarding 
Palestine ‘aim at promoting greater Palestinian control, autonomy and capacity to exercise 
responsibility to prepare for future statehood.’191 Over the years, the EU’s assistance to the 
Palestinians has thus primarily focussed on state-building.192 Nevertheless, these efforts have 
not had the desired impact thus far. 193 
 
With respect to the EU’s state-building efforts regarding the Palestinian economy, the EU has 
also been involved in the field of transboundary water management between Israel and the OPT. 
Logically, EU policies regarding transboundary water management in the region have been 
directed towards the above mentioned factors of promoting greater control, autonomy and 
capacity as well. In spite of the rhetorical similarities between the EU’s official position towards 
the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the specific policies regarding the shared water 
resources, a closer analysis of the primary sources shows that there is in fact a gap between 
discourse and practice. While European discourse points towards the aim of the EU to promote 
the emergence of a viable Palestinian state, in reality European policies frustrate this process 
because they operate within the dominative power structures underlying the interaction between 
Israel and the OPT. It will become clear that the EU has partly perpetuated Israel’s discourse 
on the issue, namely regarding the JWC.   
 
6.1 The evolvement of the EU’s position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict   
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The EU’s commitment towards the two-state solution has been slowly developed over time, 
starting out in the early 1970s when the European Economic Community (EEC) began with 
coordinating a common policy towards the Middle East. Prior to the 1970s, foreign policy on a 
European level did not exist yet since the focus of the EEC had been primarily on economic 
integration.194 According to Joel Peters, the involvement of the EEC with the Middle East was 
predominantly the result of the search for a European identity as well as the wish to develop a 
common foreign policy. A common policy would contribute towards the EEC’s desired position 
as a global political actor with a larger influence in the international community. In particular, 
a more prominent role regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would contribute towards 
achieving a more powerful position within the international system.195 To advance this role, the 
EEC established the European Political Cooperation in 1970.196  
 
The first official declaration on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict referring to the Palestinian 
people was issued shortly after the Yom Kippur War, sometimes also referred to as the October 
War.197 As has been described already in the fourth chapter of this thesis, in October 1973 Syria 
and Egypt together started an assault on Israel on the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, with the aim 
to recapture the territories taken by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967. This first declaration 
on behalf of the EEC condemned the Israeli occupation over these territories and expressed 
support for the Palestinian right ‘to express a national identity’.198 Prior to this event, the EEC 
had already issued the ‘’Schuman Document’’ in 1971 in which the member states called for 
the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the recognition of Israel by Arab 
states, but at that point had still refrained from referring to the Palestinian people.199  
 
According to Israel the declaration by the EEC in 1973 was the direct result of the ways in 
which the Arab states had put pressure on the western states who had supported Israel during 
the war. Besides the United States, several European countries had assisted Israel during the 
war. In return, under the leadership of Saudi Arabia the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
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Exporting Countries (AOPEC) imposed an oil embargo on these countries. The goal as 
formulated by AOPEC was the entire withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories 
and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.200 Out of the European countries, 
the Netherlands was the only country AOPEC imposed a full embargo on because the Dutch 
minister of Defence at the time, Henk Vredeling, had secretly issued military support for Israel. 
Even though the embargo was only fully imposed on the Netherlands and it was proved to be 
neither effective nor efficient economically for the member states of the EEC, politically the 
events nevertheless pressured the EEC in meeting these exact demands.  
 
According to Khader, the Venice Declaration of June 1980 constituted a major shift in European 
policy. In spite of the already troubled diplomatic relationship with Israel following the 
recognition of Palestinian rights, with the Venice Declaration the nine member states 
nevertheless went one step further and stated their common position that the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict could only be resolved if ‘the Palestinian people be allowed to exercise fully its rights 
to self-determination.’201 Israel responded to the declaration by stating that ‘nothing will remain 
of the Venice Declaration but its bitter memory. The Resolution calls upon us and other nations 
to include in the Peace Process, the Arab S.S. known as the PLO.’202 As has been explained in 
the third chapter however, throughout these years the EU’s condemnation of Israeli policies has 
remained rhetorical. Up until today, the EU is refraining from imposing sanctions or enforcing 
conditionality in an attempt to influence Israel’s behaviour towards the OPT.203   
 
Consequently, upon request by Israel the EEC was not allowed to play a significant role in the 
different peace talks which took place in Madrid and Oslo during the 1990s because it was 
believed that due to the leverage the Arab states had over the EEC the organization could not 
be considered a honest mediator. According to Peters, despite its marginal role during the peace 
talks the EU continued to reinforce its normative framework by condemning the Israeli 
settlements and voicing support for Palestinian self-determination. Similarly, Khader has 
argued that even though the policies of the EU have frequently been inconsistent, the ‘EU’s 
statements have largely contributed not only to bolster Palestinian legitimate claims, but also 
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have been instrumental in the world-wide recognition of Palestinian rights.’204 Through the 
Barcelona Process which was launched in 1997, the EU briefly tried to conduct peace talks 
apart from the influence of the United States but these ultimately failed due to the collapse of 
the peace process and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000.  
 
It has already been mentioned that because of the increasing presence of Al Qaida in the Middle 
East, the EU member states feared that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict could potentially 
cause a rise in international terrorism as well. During the 1970s, Europe had already witnessed 
Palestinian terrorist attacks.205 Concerned with its own security interests, European support for 
a Palestinian state took on a new sense of urgency. In 1998, the EU mentioned Palestinian 
statehood as a possible solution to the conflict.206 In 2002, the EU member states for the first 
time proposed the solution which has become the EU policy goal up until today, namely an end 
to the occupation and ‘the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign 
State of Palestine.’207  
 
According to Joel Peters, due to the EU’s own security concerns ‘strategies opposed to, or 
preventing the emergence of a viable Palestinian state, have been regarded as inimical to 
European interests.’208 From the following analysis of European policy and funding it will 
become clear however that the current EU policies regarding the issue of water between the 
two parties is in fact preventing the emergence of a viable Palestinian state.  
 
6.2 The EU-Palestine Action Plan and the Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine  
 
As a result of the Oslo II Agreement the European Commission and the Palestinian Authority 
signed the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation in 
December 1996.209 One of the aims of the agreement was to contribute to the social and 
economic development of the OPT.210 As specified in article 50, it provided the first basis for 
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cooperation on issues of water. Since its launch in 2004, the EU’s relation with the OPT is 
governed by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims at ‘supporting the 
economic development of its partner countries, and to improve the aspirations, hopes and 
prospects of the local population, while keeping a strong focus on good governance, democracy 
and the rule of law.’211 As part of this framework, EU policy regarding the OPT is laid out more 
concretely in the ‘EU-Palestine Action Plan’ of 2013.  
 
As part of the EU’s commitment to the two-state solution, which is briefly restated in the Action 
Plan, the ‘control of the Palestinian people over its natural resources, including the equitable 
and reasonable allocation of trans boundary water resources, in line with the relevant norms of 
international law and to be pursued alongside other final status issues’ is specifically 
mentioned.212 Moreover, ‘facilitating territorial management and access, including to natural 
resources’ is labelled as a specific policy objective. According to the Action Plan, the objective 
of the EU is to ‘develop the necessary legal and institutional framework for an integrated water 
and wastewater management system to ensure equitable service delivery and resource 
sustainability all over the OPT and provide support for its implementation.’213 In order to be 
able to reach this goal, the benchmarks are specified as the ‘establishment of a water 
management regulatory body, allocation of resources for a national, regionally connected water 
distribution network and for desalination.’214 It thus appears that the aim of the EU is to focus 
on Palestinian organizational and institutional capacities and technological advancements when 
its comes to desalination. Although it is mentioned in the Action Plan that the current 
relationship between Israel and the PA hinders the progress of Palestinian projects in different 
areas, primarily because of the ongoing occupation, EU policy is not directed towards 
challenging the unequal distribution of water by the Israeli state.215  
 
Between 2014 and 2016, funding for Palestinian projects was allocated on the basis of the 
Single Support Framework, which was later replaced by the European Joint Strategy in support 
of Palestine (hereafter Joint Strategy) which will stay in place between 2017 and 2020. In the 
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Joint Strategy, the EU acknowledges more extensively the conditions of the Israeli occupation 
and emphasizes how these conditions limit the possible impact of EU initiatives regarding 
Palestine.216 It is also acknowledged that the conflict is dominated by Israeli narratives, which 
leaves little agency for the Palestinians.217 The Joint Strategy explicitly mentions the possibility 
that international aid which is supposed to assist in Palestinian development in reality enforces 
the occupation instead.218 According to the EU, the purpose of the Joint Strategy is therefore to 
enhance the coherence between the EU’s support of the two-state solution and the specific 
development policy goals.219 But besides acknowledging these issues, the policy goals are not 
formulated with the aim to challenge the status quo.   
 
The EU policy objectives are categorized under five pillars, of which two focus on sustainable 
economic development. Pillar 4, ‘Access to self-sufficient water and energy services’, is one of 
the two pillars which contributes to the economic development of Palestine, which is a 
prerequisite for a viable Palestinian state.220 It is argued that sustainable economic development 
is not achievable without an end to the occupation.221 It is also mentioned that the Gaza Strip 
in particular suffers from a lack of sufficient access to water (and energy), which according to 
the EU may well lead to a humanitarian crisis.222 As has been shown in the fourth chapter, the 
United Nations and Amnesty International share this view and have already labelled the 
situation in Gaza as a crisis. According to the EU, Oslo II has resulted in the fact that Israel 
now controls ‘over 80% of all water resources in the West Bank, and the limited access to water 
and sanitation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a growing concern, with the management 
of trans boundary waters a key unresolved issue.’223  
 
In response, the policy objective regarding the Palestinian water sector is to ‘continue to support 
national institutions and service providers in: improving the sustainable operation of water and 
wastewater infrastructure and the management of water resources, as well as improving 
sustainable access to water supply and wastewater systems by contributing to the rehabilitation 
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and construction of water wells and distribution/collection systems, sewerage networks, 
desalination and wastewater treatment plants.’224  
 
In spite of the EU’s rhetoric regarding the limits put in place by the Israeli occupation, the Joint 
Strategy thereby fails to adequately address the organizational framework which effectively 
hinders progress in the entire Palestinian water sector, namely the JWC. At the time of the 
publication of the Joint Strategy the JWC was temporarily not operative due to increasing 
tensions between Israel and the PA, leading the EU to conclude that ‘the political and technical 
framework to ensure fair distribution of water between Israel and Palestine is not in place.’225  
 
Upon comparing EU policy with Israel’s discourse regarding the transboundary water issues, 
there are a number of important observations which consequently have implications for our 
understanding of Israel’s hydro-hegemony. As has been described in the second chapter of this 
thesis, hydro-hegemony can be defined as ‘the success of a basin riparian in imposing a 
discourse, preserving its interests and impeding changes to a convenient status quo.’ 226 To start, 
the foregoing analysis has shown that the EU only partly perpetuates Israel’s discourse. Since 
the EU explicitly acknowledges that the current disparity in water access between Israel and 
the Palestinians is a result of the Israeli occupation as well as the regulations laid down in Oslo 
II, Israel has clearly failed to impose its discourse of the distribution of water as being 
determined by environmental factors. At the same time, the analysis has shown that the EU 
nevertheless presents the JWC as a cooperative body. It can therefore be concluded that Israel 
has succeeded in imposing its discourse of cooperation with the Palestinians, in spite of the fact 
that the JWC effectively operates on the condition of Israeli veto. In terms of policy, it has 
become clear that the EU solely focusses on improving the Palestinian water sector on an 
institutional and technical level. By failing to adequately challenge the status quo, the EU thus 
practically assists Israel in sustaining its hydro-hegemony.  
 
The fact that the EU only partly perpetuates Israel’s discourse suggests that the EU’s 
compliance with the existing power asymmetry can rather be attributed to Israel’s bargaining 
power instead of Israel’s ideational power. The EU’s portrayal of the JWC is convenient 
because in acknowledging the dominative nature of the committee the EU would practically 
                                                
224 Ibid, 37.   
225 Ibid, 107.   
226 Ibid, 16.  
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imply that its own current policy is enforcing the Israeli occupation. Taking into consideration 
the broader relationship between Israel and the EU as it has been described in the third chapter 
of this thesis, one can therefore conclude that the role of the EU in sustaining Israel’s hydro-
hegemony cannot be characterized as a misguided donor intervention.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide a comprehensive answer to the following research 
question: To what extent has EU policy regarding transboundary water resources in the OPT 
enforced Israel’s hydro-hegemony? The research question has been addressed by means of a 
qualitative case study. The methods chosen for the research were a review of the academic 
literature and the analysis of primary sources in the form of Israeli and EU policy documents. 
The research has engaged with the academic literature on hydropolitics and has drawn on the 
approach of the London Water Research Group. Consequently, the thesis has been based on a 
neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony and a Marxist approach to political economy, arguing 
that transboundary water interaction is ultimately determined by power relations. Mark Zeitoun 
and Jeroen Warner’s framework of hydro-hegemony has been used as a theoretical foundation 
for the case study. This conclusion consists of a presentation of the findings, followed by a 
discussion of the limits of the research and the implications for future research.  
7.1 Findings  
As for the contextual background of the case study, the strategic, economic and scientific 
elements of the relationship between Israel and the EU have been analysed. It has been shown 
that Israel is of strategic value to the EU when it comes to enlarging both the EU’s internal and 
external security. When it comes to economic ties, it has been found that the EU is Israel’s 
largest trading partner. It has become clear that throughout the years, the high level of economic 
cooperation has ensured a stable relationship in spite of diplomatic tensions. Moreover, Israel 
has been an important contributor towards the EU’s research and development programs. 
Overall, it was concluded in this chapter that the EU’s lack of imposing sanctions on Israel can 
be attributed to the importance of these elements in the particular relationship between Israel 
and the EU.  
Subsequently, the issue of water has been analysed in the broader context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. It was found that the current disparity in water access between Israeli’s and 
Palestinians has been a consequence of the start of the Israeli occupation in 1967. The analysis 
has shown that through the Oslo process, during which Israel had a significantly better position 
in the negotiations than the PLO, Israel has been able to institutionalize its control over the 
transboundary water resources. It has become clear that the JWC should be regarded as a tool 
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for Israel to exert its domination over transboundary water issues. The international community 
largely failed to recognize the Oslo Accords for what they were; a means for Israel to continue 
its occupation over Palestinian land and resources. The chapter concluded by showing that up 
until today, international donor policies and funding remains directed on the basis of the 
principles set out in this agreement.  
Thereafter, the next chapter has focussed upon Israel’s discourse regarding the water issue. 
Through the analysis of policy documents from the Israel Water Authority, accompanied by 
secondary literature, it was found that Israel makes use of several discursive tactics in an attempt 
to remain its position as hydro-hegemon. Through the representation of water as a scarce 
resource, water has become securitized in the Israeli discourse. Water scarcity is used by Israel 
as a justification for its policies regarding the OPT. Furthermore, through knowledge 
construction Israel has attempted to exclude from the policy agenda the solution of giving the 
PA more control over the shared water resources. Besides that, in an attempt to sanction the 
discourse Israel has consistently downplayed its own violations of the agreements while 
emphasizing its will to cooperate with the Palestinians.  
In the last chapter, the evolvement of the EU’s position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
has been described and EU policy regarding transboundary water resources in the OPT have 
been examined. It has been found that EU donor policies are not in accordance with the EU’s 
official position of supporting the two-state solution. In short, it has been shown that EU donor 
policies are solely directed towards improving the organizational and institutional capacities of 
the OPT. The EU has thereby failed to challenge the status quo under the Israeli occupation. It 
has been found that while recognizing the failure of the Oslo process, the EU nevertheless 
perpetuates Israel’s discourse of cooperation when it comes to the JWC. This observation has 
led to the conclusion that the EU’s compliance with the existing power asymmetry can be 
attributed mainly to Israel’s bargaining power. The EU’s role in sustaining Israel’s hydro-
hegemony should therefore not be regarded as a misguided donor intervention, but rather as a 
consequence of the relationship between the EU and Israel.  
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7.2 Limitations and implications for future research  
 
 
As has been mentioned in the introduction, the analysis of the primary sources was limited to 
English written sources. In addition to that, it should be noted that due to the time and scope of 
the thesis the amount of primary sources used to carry out the research has been relatively small. 
Future research could for instance make use EU policy documents regarding Israel as well. 
Moreover, because of its reliance on the theoretical framework of hydro-hegemony the course 
of the research was initially focussed predominantly on ideational power; Israel’s ability to 
establish and control the discourse. Ultimately, from the findings of the case study it can be 
concluded that the research should have equally incorporated Israel’s bargaining power 
regarding the EU as well. Future research could also focus more on the relationship between 
these two dimensions of power as they have been distinguished by Steven Lukes.   
 
.  
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